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BORDER ADJUSTMENTS FOR CARBON TAXES, PPMS, AND 
THE WTO 
MATTHEW C. PORTERFIELD* 
There is a growing consensus that carbon taxes will be an 
essential component of the response to climate change.  Most recent 
carbon tax proposals provide for a domestic tax on fossil fuels at the 
point of extraction with border adjustments of the tax on imports 
and exports of products from energy-intensive sectors.  The border 
adjustment of the tax would both protect domestic industries from 
unfair competition and prevent the “leakage” of emissions that 
would occur if production of energy-intensive goods shifted to 
jurisdictions without comparable carbon pricing.  The prospect of 
new import fees and export rebates, however, has raised concerns 
about the potential for conflict with the rules of the World Trade 
Organization. 
The debate has centered on whether taxes on inputs that are 
used in the production process, but are not incorporated in the final 
product, may be border adjusted.  The question of whether 
governments may regulate imported products based on “process or 
production methods” (“PPMs”) that do not affect the physical 
properties of the products has played a central role in discussions of 
the relationship between international trade rules and 
environmental measures over the last three decades.  The WTO rules 
addressing the border adjustment of taxes, however, have a 
different and much older provenance.  Governments have border 
adjusted consumption taxes for more than two centuries.  The 
relevant WTO rules were drafted to accommodate this practice with 
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regard not only to taxes on finished products but also to taxes on 
inputs used in the production process.  Accordingly, border 
adjustments for carbon taxes are a WTO-consistent policy tool that 
can be used as part of the broader efforts to address climate change. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The accelerating climate crisis has generated growing support 
for carbon pricing,1 including a statement signed by twenty-seven 
Nobel Laureate economists identifying carbon taxes as “the most 
cost-effective lever to reduce carbon emissions at the scale and speed 
that is necessary.”2  Most recent proposals call for a carbon tax with 
two central elements: a domestic tax and border tax adjustments on 
imports and exports.3  The domestic tax would be levied on fossil 
fuels (coal, petroleum products and natural gas) at a specified rate 
per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (“CO2e”) “upstream” at the 
 
 1 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPPC], Global Warming of 
1.5 C: An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of 
strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, 
and efforts to eradicate poverty, at 95 (Oct. 2018) (“Policies reflecting a high price on 
emissions are necessary in models to achieve cost-effective 1.5°C pathways”); Int’l 
Energy Agency [IEA], Energy and Climate Change: World Energy Outlook Special 
Report, at 135 (2015),  https://www.iea.org/ [https://perma.cc/QMA8-SGW7] (“to 
reach across the whole of the economy (and particularly to influence private 
investors) there is no substitute for correct energy pricing, including the creation of 
expectations of a rising trend in carbon prices.”); High-Level Commission on 
Carbon Prices, Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices, at 9 (May 29, 
2017), https://static1.squarespace.com/ 
static/54ff9c5ce4b0a53decccfb4c/t/59b7f2409f8dce5316811916/1505227332748/Ca
rbonPricing_FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/29Z9-JQJ7] 
(“[A] well-designed carbon price is an indispensable part of a strategy for reducing 
emissions in an effective and cost-efficient way.”). 
 2 George Akerlof et al., Economists’ Statement on Carbon Dividends, WALL STREET 
J. (Jan. 16, 2019, 6:55 PM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/economists-statement-on-carbon-dividends-11547682910 
[https://perma.cc/QUQ7-5CGZ]. 
 3 See H.R. 7173, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018) (proposing a carbon fee on the use, 
sale or transfer of fossil fuels for an emitting use); S. 2368, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 
2018) (proposing a fee on fossil fuels produced in the United States or entering the 
United States for consumption or processing); H.R. 6463, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018) 
(proposing a tax on fossil fuels produced within or imported into the United States 
based on their potential for emitting greenhouse gasses).  See also Brian Flannery, 
Jennifer Hillman, Jan W. Mares, & Matthew Porterfield, Framework Proposal for a US 
Upstream Greenhouse Gas Tax with WTO-Compliant Border Adjustments (Resources for 
the Future, Working Paper Oct. 2018), 
https://www.rff.org/publications/working-papers/framework-proposal-for-a-
us-upstream-greenhouse-gas-tax-with-wto-compliant-border-adjustments/ 
[https://perma.cc/85FT-97LP ]; JAMES A. BAKER III ET AL., CLIMATE LEADERSHIP 
COUNCIL, THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR CARBON DIVIDENDS (2017), 
https://www.clcouncil.org/media/2017/03/The-Conservative-Case-for-Carbon-
Dividends.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YA5-VESK]. 
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point of extraction.4  The tax would be border adjusted 
“downstream” for exports by rebating the amount of the effective 
tax burden that is passed through on certain products from energy-
intensive, trade-exposed (“EITE”) sectors.  Similarly, competitive 
imports from EITE sectors would be subject to an equivalent fee.5  
The border adjustment of the carbon tax would address both 
concerns about the effects of the tax on domestic industries and the 
potential “leakage” of emissions that would occur if production of 
energy intensive goods shifted to jurisdictions without comparable 
carbon pricing.6  The prospect of new import fees and export rebates, 
however, has raised concerns about the potential for conflict with 
the rules of the World Trade Organization, particularly the 
provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) 
and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(“ASCM”). 
The debate has centered on whether taxes on inputs that are 
used in the production process but are not physically incorporated 
in the final product can be border adjusted.7  The question of 
 
 4 See, e.g., H.R. 7173, supra note 3, § 3 (adding Subtitle L, Chapter 101 (“Carbon 
Fees”) to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986); S. 2368, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 
4691—”Fee for Carbon Dioxide Emissions”—to Chapter 38 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986); H.R. 6463, supra note 3, § 101 (adding § 9901—”Imposition of Tax on 
Combusted Fossil Fuel Greenhouse Gas Emissions”—to the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986); BAKER III ET AL., supra note 3, at 1 (“The first pillar of a carbon dividends 
plan is a gradually increasing tax on carbon dioxide emissions, to be implemented 
at the refinery or the first point where fossil fuels enter the economy, meaning the 
mine, well or port.”). 
 5 See S. 2368, supra note 3, § 101, at 20 (adding § 4695—”Border Adjustments 
for Energy-Intensive Manufactured Goods” to Chapter 38 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986); H.R. 6463, supra note 3, § 101, Part 2 (“Tax Adjustments for Imports 
and Exports of Greenhouse Gas Products”).  See also BAKER III ET AL., supra note 3, 
at 1: 
Border adjustments for the carbon content of both imports and exports 
would protect American competitiveness and punish free-riding by other 
nations, encouraging them to adopt carbon pricing of their own. Exports 
to countries without comparable carbon pricing systems would receive 
rebates for carbon taxes paid, while imports from such countries would 
face fees on the carbon content of their products. 
 6 See High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices, supra note 1, at 41 (“Concerns 
over carbon leakage and unfair competition can also be tackled by improving policy 
coordination across countries and introducing so-called border carbon 
adjustments.”). 
 7 See generally JAMES BACCHUS, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, THE 
CASE FOR A WTO CLIMATE WAIVER (Jennifer Goyder et al. eds., 2017), 
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/NEWEST%20Climat
e%20Waiver%20-%20Bacchus_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVL2-X3M6] (noting that it 
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whether governments may regulate imported products based on 
their “process or production methods”(“PPMs”), and particularly 
“non-product related” PPMs (“NPR-PPMs”) that do not affect the 
physical properties of the product, has played a central role in 
discussions of the relationship between international trade rules and 
environmental measures over the last three decades.8 
The issue has been raised primarily in the context of “like 
product” analysis under the national treatment provisions of Article 
III of the GATT.  The WTO’s Appellate Body has indicated that 
different NPR-PPMs generally do not render products “unlike” and 
that therefore NPR-PPM-based regulatory restrictions on imported 
products constitute impermissible discrimination.9  Accordingly, it 
has been suggested, border tax adjustments (“BTAs”) based on the 
carbon dioxide emissions associated with the production of 
internationally traded products are similarly precluded because 
they would result in discrimination between “like” products based 
on PPMs—emissions from the production process—that do not 
affect the physical composition or performance of the products.10  As 
 
is unclear whether WTO rules permit the border adjustment of taxes based on the 
amount of carbon emitted in the process of producing a product). 
 8 See generally Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: 
Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT’L L., 59, 59–64 (2002) (discussing the 
controversy over the status of PPM-based environmental measures under the 
WTO). 
 9 See Warren H. Maruyama, Climate Change and the WTO: Cap and Trade versus 
Carbon Tax?, 45 J. WORLD TRADE, 679, 696 (2011) (“[N]either Panels nor the Appellate 
Body have allowed a WTO Member to impose trade restrictions on imported ‘like 
products’ that are aimed at objectionable foreign environmental practices and 
production methods that do not affect the product’s actual physical characteristics 
and uses and take place outside the Member’s territory.”).  Article XX’s 
environmental exceptions, however, permit governments to regulate products 
based on different PPMs if they do so in a manner that is, inter alia, not unduly 
coercive.  See discussion infra Section 4.2. 
 10 See, e.g., Madison Condon & Ada Ignaciuk, Border Carbon Adjustment and 
International Trade: A Literature Review 18 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., 
Trade and Env’t Working Paper No. 2013/06, 2013), https://www.oecdilibrary.org 
[https://perma.cc/F9U6-9YHP]: 
Whether or not production processes may be taken into account to 
determine product likeness is crucial for [carbon tax BTA] measures.  
Under some proposed schemes, cement made in China using power 
generated by coal-fired plants would be subject to a higher tax burden, 
than, for example, cement produced domestically using natural gas.  So, 
while a certain regulation on its face could seem neutral with respect to 
national origin, as applied it could still systematically tax imports from a 
particular country more heavily.  While the WTO distinguishes between 
de facto and de jure discrimination, both are illegal unless justified. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss1/2
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a result of the prevalence of this view, much of the analysis of the 
status of carbon BTAs under the WTO has focused on the extent to 
which they could be justified under the environmental exceptions of 
Articles XX(b) and XX(g) of the GATT.11 
Recourse to the environmental exceptions, however, is not 
necessary to establish the WTO-consistency of a properly designed 
carbon tax.  The text and negotiating histories of the GATT and the 
ASCM indicate that internal taxes on products, including taxes 
imposed on inputs into products at prior stages in the production 
process, may be border adjusted on like imports and exports.  
Although there has been some dispute over whether “taxes 
occultes” (hidden taxes) on inputs that are not physically present in 
the final product may be border adjusted, that issue was largely 
resolved during the Uruguay Round negotiations through the 
inclusion of language in the ASCM that explicitly permits the border 
adjustment of taxes on energy and fuels used in the production 
process. 
Section 2 of this Article traces the history of the GATT and WTO 
rules on BTAs, from the original provisions in GATT 1947 that 
accommodated the long-standing practice of border-adjusting 
consumption taxes on both products and their production inputs, to 
the clarification in the Uruguay Round negotiations that taxes on 
fuels and energy used in the production process  are similarly border 
adjustable.  Section 3 reviews the limited GATT and WTO 
jurisprudence addressing border tax adjustments.  Section 4 
discusses the PPM issue as it has been raised both in the context of 
Article III and Article XX of the GATT.  Section 5 attempts to 
reconcile the PPM jurisprudence with the GATT and ASCM 
provisions on BTAs and suggests some guidelines for designing 
carbon BTAs to minimize the risk of trade conflict. 
 
 11 See, e.g., Michael Mehling et al., Designing Border Carbon Adjustments for 
Enhanced Climate Action 36–40 (Claudia Delpero ed., 2017), 
http://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/CS_report-Dec-2017-
4.pdf [https://perma.cc/KCH2-TBWX] (discussing uncertainty concerning the 
consistency of carbon BTAs with GATT articles II:2(a) and III:2 and potential 
applications of Article XX exceptions). 
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2.  THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE WTO’S PROVISIONS ON 
BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENT 
2.1.   Pre-GATT Practice on BTAs 
The United States practice with regard to border tax adjustments 
dates back to the First Congress, which in 1789 enacted legislation 
permitting the border adjustment on exports of duties on previously 
imported products.12  Several decades later, David Ricardo provided 
the economic rationale for border adjustment of domestic taxes on 
both imports and exports, arguing that a tax on a commodity 
affecting only domestic producers 
is, in fact, a bounty to that amount on the importation of the 
same commodity from abroad; and to restore competition to 
its just level, it would be necessary not only to subject the 
imported commodity to an equal tax, but to allow a 
drawback of equal amount, on the exportation of the home-
made commodity.13 
Consistent with Ricardo’s position, commercial treaties dating 
back to the 19th century have permitted the border adjustment of 
indirect taxes.14  The United States briefly attempted to limit BTAs 
 
 12 See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, ASSISTED BY CAROL GABYZON, FUNDAMENTAL TAX 
REFORM AND BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS 21–22, 37 (1996) (stating that the Whiskey 
Act of 1791 similarly permitted the border adjustment on exports of an excise tax 
on alcohol). 
 13 See DAVID RICARDO, ON PROTECTION TO AGRICULTURE 14–15 (4th ed. 1822). 
See also ALICE PIRLOT, ENVIRONMENTAL BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: FOSTERING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 12–16 (Kurt 
Deketelaere & Zen Makuch eds., 2017) (discussing Ricardo’s views on BTAs and 
their relationship to the theory of comparative advantage). 
 14 See S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 93D CONG., TAX ADJUSTMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE: GATT PROVISIONS AND EEC PRACTICES 2 (Comm. Print 1973), 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015076086241;view=1up;seq=6. 
[https://perma.cc/NRM5-89V5]: 
Countries have traditionally imposed domestic consumption taxes on 
imports.  Provisions similar to those in the GATT have been used in 
commercial treaties and agreements for over a hundred years and were 
contained in bilateral trade agreements between the United States and 
other countries from almost the beginning of the reciprocal trade 
agreements program in 1934.  This concept was carried over into the GATT 
in 1947, as proposed by the United States and other countries, reflecting 
the practical view that governments and businessmen would not have 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss1/2
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in reciprocal trade agreements in the 1930s, but abandoned the effort 
when it proved impractical and entered into numerous bilateral 
agreements that explicitly permitted the border adjustment of 
internal taxes on imports.15 
2.2.  The GATT 1947 Negotiations 
The United States continued to support the border adjustment of 
internal taxes in the negotiations on the International Trade 
Organization (“ITO”) and the GATT in the following decade.  In 
February of 1946, the Economic and Social Council of the United 
Nations adopted a resolution constituting the “Preparatory 
Committee of the International Conference on Trade and 
Employment”16 to negotiate a charter for an International Trade 
Organization.  The United States circulated a “Suggested Charter for 
an International Trade Organization” in September of 1946, which 
provided the basis for the negotiations.17 
The Suggested Charter prohibited export subsidies but explicitly 
permitted the border adjustment of internal taxes on exports.18  
 
accepted procedures which exempted competing imported goods from 
consumption taxes imposed on similar domestic goods. 
 15 See id. at n.2: 
The United States inserted provisions in three early bilateral agreements 
(with Brazil, Columbia and Cuba) negotiated under the 1934 Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act freezing internal taxes on imported products with 
respect to which tariff concessions had been granted.  Practical problems 
emerged almost immediately, however, and the policy was abandoned in 
1935.  Subsequent agreements contained a provision permitting either 
party to apply to imports a tax equivalent to any internal tax imposed on 
products produced and sold domestically. 
 16 See Rep. of the First Sess. of the Preparatory Comm. of the U.N. Conf. on 
Trade and Emp., ¶¶ 3, 11, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/33 (Oct. 31, 1946), 
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UN/EPCT/33.PDF [https://perma.cc/8MFF-
3MRA].  The United States had called for the convening of the conference in 
November of 1945.  See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, STATE DEP’T PUB. 2411, PROPOSALS FOR 
EXPANSION OF WORLD TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT, FOREWORD (Nov. 1945), 
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/eccles/036_04_0003.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3XRL-QL8Q]. 
 17 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, STATE DEP’T PUB. 2598, SUGGESTED CHARTER FOR AN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, (Sept. 1946), reprinted 
in Rep. of the First Session of the Preparatory Comm. of the U.N. Conf.  on Trade 
and Emp, supra note 16, at 52–67 [hereinafter Suggested Charter]. 
 18  Id. art. 25(2): 
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Similarly, the Suggested Charter contained a national treatment 
provision (Article 9) that permitted the border adjustment of 
internal taxes on imports so long as they were not imposed at a level 
“higher than those imposed on like products of national origin . . . 
.”19  Although Article 9 did not address the border adjustability of 
taxes related to the production process, the issue was subsequently 
addressed in the negotiations.  During the First Session of the 
Preparatory Committee in London, the United Kingdom proposed 
clarifying that the national treatment obligation with regard to 
internal taxes applied not only to taxes “imposed on” but also to 
taxes imposed “in connection with” like domestic products.20  The 
rapporteurs of a technical subcommittee charged with preparing a 
revised national treatment article substituted the phrase “directly or 
indirectly” for “in connection with” due to concerns about an 
equivalent translation of the latter phrase in French.21 
A Drafting Committee meeting in Lake Success, New York in 
early 1947 incorporated this language in the national treatment 
provision of the first draft of the GATT as a separate document from 
the ITO Charter.22  Later that year, during the Second Session of the 
 
[N]o Member shall grant, directly or indirectly, any subsidy on the 
exportation of any product, or establish or maintain any other system 
which results in the sale of such product for export at a price lower than 
the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the 
domestic market, due allowance being made for differences in conditions 
and terms of sale, for differences in taxation, and for other differences 
affecting price comparability. The preceding sentence shall not be construed to 
prevent any Member from exempting exported products from duties or taxes 
imposed in respect of like products when consumed domestically or from remitting 
such duties or taxes which have accrued. 
(emphasis added). 
 19 Id. art. 9 ¶ 1 (“National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation”). 
 20 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Preparatory Comm. of the Int’l Conf. on Trade 
and Emp., Comm. II, Observations of the U.K. Delegation on Items 2–7 of the 
Provisional Agenda of the Tech. Sub-Comm. on Customs Procedure at 1, U.N. Doc. 
E/PC/T/C.II/11 (Oct. 26, 1946), 
https://docs.wto.org/’=gattdocs/q/UN/EPCT/CII-11.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/S3EE-5HNS]. 
 21 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Preparatory Comm. of the Int’l Conf. on 
Trade and Emp., Comm. II, Tech. Sub-Committee, 2nd mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. 
E/PC/T/C.II/W.5 (Oct. 31, 1946), 
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UN/EPCT/CII-W5.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/C79N-CPPT]. 
 22 See U.N. Conf. on Trade and Emp., Rep. of the Drafting Comm. of the 
Preparatory Comm., 66, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/34 (Mar. 9, 1947) (“The products of the 
territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other 
contracting party shall be exempt from internal taxes and other internal charges of 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss1/2
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Preparatory Committee in Geneva, the delegate from Brazil 
questioned whether the reference to taxes imposed “directly or 
indirectly” would apply to direct taxes, such as  corporate income 
taxes, which traditionally had been treated as non-adjustable.23  The 
United States delegate responded that the reference to taxes 
imposed “indirectly” was intended to cover “not the tax on a 
product as such but on the processing of the product  . . . .”24  The 
“directly or indirectly” language remained in Article III:2 of the 
GATT as signed in Geneva on October 30, 1947.25 
A provision included in Article II:2 of GATT 1947 similarly 
reflects the understanding of the drafters that internal taxes relating 
to the production of a product may be border adjusted.  Article 
II:2(a) states that Article II does not prevent contracting parties from 
imposing on an imported product “a charge equivalent to an 
internal tax imposed consistently with . . . [Article III:2] . . . in 
respect of the like domestic product or in respect of an article from 
which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole 
or in part . . . .”26  The Chairman of the Legal Drafting Committee 
 
any kind higher than those imposed, directly or indirectly, on like products of 
national origin.”) (emphasis added).  Similar language on national treatment is 
included in Article 15:2 of the Draft ITO charter produced by the Drafting 
Committee.  See id. at 17.  For a general discussion of the Drafting Committee’s 
work, see DOUGLAS A. IRWIN ET AL., THE GENESIS OF THE GATT 111–114 (2008). 
 23 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Preparatory Comm. of the U.N. Conf. on Trade 
and Emp., 2nd Sess., 9th mtg. of Comm’n A in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, 
Verbatim Report, at 18–19, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/PV/9 (June 5, 1947), http://sul-
derivatives.stanford.edu/derivative?CSNID=90240083&mediaType=application/
pdf [https://perma.cc/GGX5-4YBD]. 
 24 Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
 25 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 art. III:2 (“The products of the territory of any contracting party 
imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, 
directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess 
of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.”).  An interpretive 
note to Article III added in 1948 clarified that 
[a]ny internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or 
requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 which applies to an 
imported product and to the like domestic product and is collected or 
enforced in the case of the imported product at the time or point of 
importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax or other 
internal charge, or a law, regulation or requirement of the kind referred to 
in paragraph 1, and is accordingly subject to the provisions of article III. 
Protocol Modifying Part II and Article XXVI of the Gen. Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, Sept. 14, 1948, 62 U.N.T.S. No. 814. III, at 104. 
 26 GATT, supra note 25, art. II:2(a) (emphasis added).  This language had 
previously been proposed by the United States as a note to be included in each 
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explained that this language required that adjustments based on 
taxes on the inputs of imported products must be made by reference 
to those inputs rather than the manufactured product: 
[I]f a duty is imposed on an article because a duty is imposed 
on part of the content of this article, then the duty should 
only be imposed regarding the particular content of this 
article. For example, if a duty is imposed on perfume because 
it contains alcohol, the duty to be imposed must take into 
consideration the value of the alcohol and not the value of 
the perfume; that is to say, the value of the content and not 
the value of the whole.27 
There has been some debate over the relationship between 
GATT Articles III:2 and II:2(a) and whether they apply to the same 
scope of measures.28  The text of Article II:2, however, indicates that 
it is simply intended to clarify that the tariff concessions referenced 
in Article II:1 do not prevent States from imposing certain other 
types of charges on imported products, including border 
adjustments of internal taxes (subparagraph 2(a)), “any anti-
dumping or countervailing duty applied consistently with the 
provisions of Article VI” (subparagraph 2(b)), and “fees or other 
charges commensurate with the cost of services rendered” 
 
country’s tariff schedule.  See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Drafting Comm. of the 
Preparatory Comm. of the U.N. Conf. on Trade and Emp., Tentative and Non-
Committal Draft Suggested by the Delegation of the United States General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, E/PC/T/C.6/W.58 (Feb. 7, 1947). 
 27 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Preparatory Comm. of the U.N. Conf. on Trade 
and Emp., 2nd Sess., 26th Mtg. of the Tariff Agreement Comm. at 10:30 a.m. in the 
Palais des Nations, Geneva, Verbatim Report at 21, U.N. Doc. 
E/PC/T/TAC/PV/26 (Sept. 23, 1947), 
https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/yy010ry5730/90260096.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RAG7-453B].  See GATT Secretariat, Report by the Working Party 
on Border Tax Adjustments, ¶¶ 39-44, L/3464 (Nov. 20, 1970), 
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90840088.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/74BZ-F8YA] [hereinafter Working Party Report]. 
 28 See PIRLOT, supra note 13, at 12–16 (discussing alternative interpretations of 
Article II:2(a) as either overlapping with Article III:2, clarifying the scope of Article 
II’s tariff concessions, or applying to different types of BTAs). 
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(subparagraph 2(c)).  The WTO’s Secretariat29 and several GATT 
panels have endorsed this interpretation.30 
The prohibition on export subsidies proposed by the United 
States in the Suggested Charter31 was not included in GATT 1947.  
Instead, Article XVI imposed only weak notification and 
consultation requirements concerning subsidies.32  Accordingly, 
because it did not prohibit export subsidies, there was no need for 
explicit language indicating that border adjustments of indirect 
taxes on exports were permissible.33  Article VI:4, however, reflected 
 
 29 See Comm. on Trade and the Env’t, Note by the Secretariat: Taxes and Charges 
for Envt’l Purposes—Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 40, WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/47 (May 
2, 1997) (noting that Article II:2 permits the imposition on imports of charges 
equivalent to internal taxes “[n]otwithstanding the obligations set forth in the 
relevant provisions of Article II (Schedules of Concessions) of GATT 1994  . . .”). 
 30 See Report of the Panel, United States – Customs User Fee, ¶ 70, L/6264 (Feb. 
2, 1988) GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.), at 283 (1989) (“Paragraph 1(b) of Article II 
establishes a general ceiling on the charges that can be levied on a product whose 
tariff is bound . . . Article II:2 permits governments to impose, above this ceiling, 
three types of non-tariff charges . . . .”).  See also Report of the Panel, United States—
Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, ¶ 5.2.7, L/61775 (June 17, 1987) 
GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.), at 136 (1987) (Article II:2(a) “clarifies” that tariff 
concessions do not prevent border adjustment of taxes as provided for in Article 
III:2); Report of the Panel, EEC Measures on Animal Feed Proteins, ¶ 4.16(c), L/4599 
(Mar. 14, 1978) GATT B.I.S.D. (25th Supp), at 49 (1978): 
The wording of Article II:2(a) which refers to ‘charges equivalent to 
internal taxes’ is different from that of Article III:2 which refers to ‘internal 
taxes and other charges of any kind’, but it appeared to be the common 
understanding of the drafters of these articles that their scope should be 
the same as to the kind of measures being covered  . . . . 
 31 See Suggested Charter, supra note 17, art. 25. 
 32 GATT, supra note 25, art. XVI:1: 
If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any 
form of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to 
increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product 
into, its territory, it shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing 
of the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of the 
subsidization on the quantity of the affected product or products imported 
into or exported from its territory and of the circumstances making the 
subsidization necessary. In any case in which it is determined that serious 
prejudice to the interests of any other contracting party is caused or 
threatened by any such subsidization, the contracting party granting the 
subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the other contracting party or 
parties concerned, or with the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the possibility 
of limiting the subsidization. 
 33 See S. Comm. on Finance, supra note 14, at 3 (“Since the original GATT 
allowed export subsidization, there was at that time no reason for the GATT to 
specifically note that the exemption or rebate on exports of consumption taxes 
could not be considered to be a subsidy.”) 
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the understanding that rebates of indirect taxes on exported 
products did not constitute subsidies, stating that such rebates or 
exemptions could not be the basis for anti-dumping or 
countervailing duties.34 
2.3.  The 1954-1955 Review Session 
During the 1954-1955 GATT Review Session, Germany proposed 
a new interpretive note to Article III:2 that would clarify that the 
reference to “internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in 
excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic 
products” included “charges at various stages of  . . . production 
[including] charges borne by the raw materials, semi-finished 
products, auxiliary materials, etc. incorporated in, and by the power 
consumed for the production of, the finished products.”35  Delegates from 
other Contracting Parties expressed a range of views on this 
proposal and it was ultimately not adopted.36 
The Review Session, however, did result in new provisions on 
export subsidies and BTAs based on Articles 26-28 of the Havana 
Charter.37  Language was added (Section B of the current Article 
XVI) imposing a qualified prohibition on export subsidies on non-
primary products that resulted in their sale at a lower price than the 
like product sold domestically.  Significantly, the Contracting 
Parties also inserted an Ad Note to Article XVI, clarifying that “[t]he 
exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the 
like product when destined for domestic consumption, or the 
 
 34 GATT, supra note 25, art. VI:4.  See also S. Comm. on Finance, supra note 14, 
at 3. 
 35 GATT Secretariat, Review Working Party II on Tariffs, Schedules and Customs 
Administration, Report to the Contracting Parties, ¶ 10, L/329 (Feb. 24, 1955) (emphasis 
added), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/L999/329.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/W642-A5BS]. 
 36 Despite its prominent role in the drafting of both Articles II:2 and III:2 to 
apply to taxes imposed on the production process, the United States argued that 
“internal taxes” should be interpreted to apply only to taxes on finished products.  
Id. 
 37 See Analytical Index of the GATT: Article XVI, Subsidies, at 445, 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/gatt1994_art16_gatt
47.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PPL-H333]; U.N. Conf. on Trade and Emp., Final Act 
and Related Documents, 44–46, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/78 (Apr. 1948), 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2FVF-EKVH] (containing the final version of the Havana 
Charter, conference resolutions, and annexed documents). 
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remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those 
which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.”38 
Although the Ad Note does not address the remission of taxes 
on the production of exported products, the adjustability of taxes on 
inputs was discussed during the negotiations on the provision of the 
Havana Charter on which the Ad Note was based.39  Sweden had 
proposed adding language clarifying that the exemption or 
remission of domestic consumption taxes, whether imposed 
“directly or indirectly,” did not constitute a subsidy.  It withdrew its 
proposal based on an understanding that the provision permitted 
the remission “of duties or taxes imposed on raw materials and 
semi-manufactured products subsequently used in the production 
of exported manufactured goods.”40  During the Review Session, the 
Technical Group on Customs Administration similarly indicated that, 
as used in paragraph 3 of Article VII of the GATT (“Valuation for 
Customs Purposes”), the term “internal tax” referred not only to taxes 
“levied directly on the goods directly exported” but also to taxes 
levied “on the materials going into the manufacture of such goods.”41 
2.4.   The 1960 Report of the Working Party on Subsidies 
In 1960, the Working Party on Subsidies confirmed that taxes 
imposed at different stages of the production process could be 
border adjusted on exports of non-primary products.  The Working 
Party produced a “Declaration Giving Effect to the Provisions of 
Article XVI:4”42 that addressed export subsidies on non-primary 
 
 38 GATT, Annex A, 218, Mar. 10, 1955, 1957 U.N.T.S. 278, 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20278/v278.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8VQZ-B4TB].  This language was repeated in footnote 1 of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
 39 See Working Party Report, supra note 27, ¶ 29. 
 40 U.N. Conf. on Trade and Emp., Reports of Committees and Principal Sub-
Committees, at 109, ¶ 18, ICITO/1/8 (Sept. 1948), 
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90180096.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A5JA-MQL3]. 
 41  GATT Secretariat Review Working Party II, supra note 35, ¶ 17. 
 42 Contracting Parties, Working Party on Subsidies, Report of the Working Party 
on Subsidies, 4, L/1381 (Nov. 1960), 
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/L1799/1381.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/HV6Q-48AE]. 
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products.43  In its report accompanying the Declaration, the Working 
Party compiled a list of practices considered to constitute 
impermissible export subsidies.  The list excluded remissions for 
“indirect taxes levied at one or several stages on the same goods if sold 
for internal consumption  . . . or amounts [not] exceeding those 
effectively levied at one or several stages on these goods in the form of 
indirect taxes.”44 
2.5.  The 1970 Report of the Working Party on Border Tax 
Adjustments 
In 1968, BTAs received even more intense scrutiny when the 
GATT Council established a Working Party on Border Tax 
Adjustments.45  The United States had proposed creating the 
Working Party due to concerns that, inter alia, the GATT’s rules on 
border adjustment relied on flawed economic assumptions and 
could provide an unfair advantage to countries that rely primarily 
on indirect taxes rather than direct taxes (e.g., corporate income 
taxes).46 
 
 43 The Declaration was eventually accepted by and went into force for 17 
countries.  See id. 
 44  Id. at 2 (emphasis added).  See S. Comm. on Finance, supra note 14, at 4–5 
(discussing the history of the “Declaration Giving Effect to the Provisions of Article 
XVI:4”). 
 45 See Council Minutes of Meeting Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva on 27 and 
28 March 1968, 8–12, C/M/46 (Apr. 5, 1968), 
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/C/M46.PDF [https://perma.cc/K6V5-
3HJB]. 
 46 See id. at 8–9; See also S. Comm. on Finance, supra note 14, at 1: 
Some American businessmen have expressed concern that their 
competitive positions, both in their home market and in markets abroad, 
have been disadvantaged because other countries levy heavy 
consumption taxes on imports and grant exemptions or rebates of such 
taxes on their exports . . . . Although virtually all countries have a general 
consumption tax system with the inevitable levy on imports and rebate or 
exemption on exports, the complaints by our businessmen are primarily 
voiced in terms of tax adjustments on goods in Europe - specifically the 
tax-on-value added.  Many of these businessmen also believe that the 
direct tax burden (corporate income tax) in Europe is much lighter than it 
is in the United States, and since the provisions of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) permit tax adjustments on imports and 
exports for consumption taxes but not for income taxes, American 
producers are disadvantaged. 
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The Working Party issued a report that was adopted by the 
Contracting Parties in 1970.47  In its report, the Working Party noted 
that although import BTAs were addressed under GATT Articles II 
and III, and export BTAs under Article XVI, “differences in wording 
[of the Articles] had not led to any differences in interpretation.  . . . 
It was agreed that GATT provisions on tax adjustment applied the 
principle of destination identically to imports and exports.”48 
The Working Party further observed that there was broad 
agreement that indirect taxes on products (e.g., sales and value 
added taxes) were adjustable whereas direct taxes on employers and 
employees were not.49  There was disagreement, however, with 
regard to certain “taxes occultes,” including taxes on goods and 
services that are used in the production and distribution of, but not 
physically incorporated into, other taxable products.50  As defined 
by the OECD in an influential 1968 report, taxes occultes include 
taxes on “a) auxiliary materials expended in the transportation or 
production of goods (e.g. energy, fuel, lubricants, packing, 
stationery); b)  durable capital equipment goods (e.g. machinery, 
buildings, vehicles); [and] c)  services (e.g. transport, advertising).”51 
 
 47 See Council Minutes, supra note 45, at 8-9.  The U.S. delegation suggested that 
the Working Party could propose appropriate “new obligations or understandings” 
with regard to BTAs.  Id. at 9.  The Working Party, however, only recommended the 
establishment of notification and consultation procedures for changes in border tax 
adjustment policies.  See also Working Party Report, supra note 27, ¶¶ 39–44. 
 48 See Working Party Report, supra note 27, § 2 ¶ 10.  See also id. § 2 ¶ 9 (“Most 
members argued that there seemed to have been a coherent approach . . . . and that 
there were no inconsistencies of substance between the different provisions even if 
the question of tax adjustments [on import and export BTAs] was dealt with in 
different Articles.”). 
 49 Id. § 2 ¶ 14.  In making this observation, however, the Working Party 
improperly conflated the meaning of “directly and indirectly” in GATT Article III:2 
with the distinction between direct and indirect taxes.  See Comm. on Trade and 
Env’t, Note by the Secretariat, Taxes and Charges for Envt’l Purposes—Border Tax 
Adjustment, ¶ 68, WT/CTE/W/47 (May 2, 1997) [https://perma.cc/6EWG-QVBB] 
(noting that the terms “directly or indirectly” in GATT Article III:2 “do not 
correspond to the distinction between direct and indirect taxes . . . contrary to what 
is suggested in paragraph 14 of the Working Group on Border Tax Adjustment.”). 
 50 See Working Party Report, supra note 27, § 2 ¶ 15(a) (defining tax occultes as 
“consumption taxes on capital equipment, auxiliary materials and services used in 
the transportation and production of other taxable goods”). 
 51 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Report 
on Tax Adjustments Applied To Exports And Imports In OECD Member Countries, at 20 
(Nov. 1968). 
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These taxes were not usually treated as subject to adjustment, 
except when implemented in the form of a cascade tax52—i.e. a tax 
imposed on a product based on its value at each stage of the 
production and distribution process, including the cumulative tax 
burden from prior stages.53 The Working Party concluded, however, 
that there was insufficient evidence of actual conflicts over the 
border adjustment of taxes occultes to warrant further deliberation 
on the subject.54 
The Working Party further observed that even some taxes that 
were viewed as adjustable raised concerns because of the difficulty 
of determining the appropriate level of border adjustment.  These 
taxes included cascade taxes and taxes on “composite goods” 
containing taxable goods.  For cascade taxes, questions arose from 
the typical practice of making border adjustments based on the 
average tax burden of “categories of products rather than 
calculating the actual tax levied on a particular product.”55  The 
Working Party concluded, however, that this was an issue of 
decreasing concern in light of the replacement of cascade taxes by 
value added taxes (“VATs”).56  With regard to composite products, 
the members of the Working Party “agreed in principle it was 
administratively sensible and sufficiently accurate to rebate by 
average rates for a given class of goods.”57 
 
 52  See Working Party Report, supra note 27, ¶ 15(a).  The Working Party also 
noted that there was disagreement over the eligibility for adjustment of “certain 
other taxes, such as property taxes, stamp duties and registration duties . . . .”  Id. 
¶15(b). 
 53 Id. §2 ¶16. 
 54 Id. §2 ¶15. 
 55 Id. §2 ¶16.  See also PIRLOT, supra note 13, at 194 (“[C]umulative indirect taxes 
have traditionally been considered eligible for BTAs despite the impossibility of 
guaranteeing a perfect equivalence between these taxes and their BTAs. 
Equivalence between taxes does not need (and cannot) be established with absolute 
certainty. Averaging has been an option for cumulative tax systems . . . “). 
 56 See Working Party Report, supra note 27, § 1 ¶ 16.  See also J. ANDREW 
HOERNER & FRANK MULLER, CARBON TAXES FOR CLIMATE PROTECTION IN A 
COMPETITIVE WORLD 33 (1996), 
http://rprogress.org/publications/1996/swiss_1996.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3GCQ-XMJU] (“By the European Commission VAT directive all 
European cascade taxes were replaced by VATs no later than 1970, later postponed 
to 1972.”). 
 57 See Working Party Report, supra note 27, ¶ 16. 
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2.6.  The 1979 Subsidies Code 
The Tokyo Round negotiations led to the adoption of the 1979 
Subsidies Code,58 which included both a broader prohibition on 
export subsidies for non-primary products and an Annex containing 
an illustrative list of export subsidies that excluded rebates of 
indirect taxes on production inputs.59  Paragraph (g) of the Annex 
indicated that the “exemption or remission in respect of the production 
and distribution of exported products, of indirect taxes” does not 
constitute an export subsidy unless it is “in excess of those levied in 
respect of the production and distribution of like products when 
sold for domestic consumption.”60  The reference to taxes on the 
“distribution” of exported products—a service that is not physically 
incorporated in the product—indicates that the disagreement in the 
Working Party61 has been resolved in favor of treating taxes occultes 
as border adjustable.  Similarly, the term “indirect taxes” was 
defined to include not only consumption taxes (sales, excise, 
turnover, and value added taxes) but also taxes not based on the 
product itself (franchise, stamp, transfer, and equipment taxes) and 
“all taxes other than direct taxes and import charges.”62  Accordingly, 
any tax that was not an import charge or within the narrow definition 
of “direct tax” (“taxes on wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties, 
and all other forms of income, and taxes on the ownership of real 
property”) was treated as a presumptively adjustable indirect tax. 
Paragraph (h), however, imposed certain limits on the remission 
of taxes occultes when implemented in the form of cascade taxes, 
referred to in the Subsidies Code as “prior stage cumulative 
indirect” (“PSCI”) taxes.63  “Prior stage” taxes were defined in the 
Annex as “those levied on goods or services used directly or 
 
 58 See Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and 
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, LT/TR/A/3 
[hereinafter 1979 Subsidies Code], 
https://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/tokyo_scm_e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WN5Y-6DQW]. 
 59  See id. art. 9 and Annex.  Unlike Article XVI:4 of GATT, the prohibition on 
export subsidies under Article 9 did not require any showing that the subsidy 
resulted in exported goods being sold for a lower price than the like product sold 
domestically. 
 60 Id. Annex ¶ (g). 
 61 See Working Party Report, supra note 27. 
 62 See 1979 Subsidies Code, supra note 58, Annex note 1. 
 63 Id. Annex ¶ (h). 
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indirectly in making the product,” and cumulative taxes as “multi-
staged taxes levied where there is no mechanism for subsequent 
crediting of the tax if the goods or services subject to tax at one stage 
of production are used in a succeeding stage of production.”64  
Although the reference in both definitions to taxes on “services” 
used on the production process implies that PSCI taxes can include 
taxes occultes, paragraph (h) prohibited the border adjustment of 
PSCI taxes except for those “levied on goods that are physically 
incorporated (making normal allowance for waste) in the exported 
product.”65  Paragraph (i) similarly prohibited the border 
adjustment on exports of import charges on goods that are used in 
the production of exported goods unless they are “physically 
incorporated” in the exported product.66 
The limitation of export border adjustments for PSCI taxes to 
those imposed on physically incorporated inputs, however, was not 
absolute.  The references to “allowance for waste” in paragraphs (h) 
and (i)67  suggest that the requirement of physical incorporation was 
not so strict that it precluded border adjustment of PSCI taxes on 
inputs that, while used in the production process, were not literally 
“physically incorporated” in the final product.  Moreover, the term 
“normal” indicates that, consistent with the 1970s Working Party’s 
endorsement of border adjustments based on the average tax burden 
for a category of products,68 the quantity of taxable inputs lost to 
waste could be estimated based on standard production practices.  
The Parties to the 1979 Subsidies Code subsequently further clarified 
that “an input need not be present in the final product in the same 
form in which it entered the production process” in order to be 
considered physically incorporated.69 
 
 64 Id. Annex note 1. 
 65 Id. Annex ¶ (h); see also id. Annex note 3 (“Paragraph (h) does not apply to 
value-added tax systems and border-tax adjustment in lieu thereof; the problem of 
the excessive remission of value-added taxes is exclusively covered by paragraph 
(g).”). 
 66 Id. Annex ¶ (i). 
 67 Id. Annex ¶¶ (h), (i). 
 68 See id. Annex ¶ (i) (including in the list of export subsidies, “[t]he remission 
or drawback of import charges in excess of those levied on imported goods that are 
physically incorporated (making normal allowance for waste) in the exported 
product”) (emphasis added). 
 69 Comm. on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Guidelines on Physical 
Incorporation, ¶ 3, GATT Doc. SCM/68 (Oct. 31, 1985), 
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/TR/SCM/68.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2HV-
CBQM]. 
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Border adjustments for PSCI taxes were subject to relatively 
more restrictive treatment than the other indirect taxes covered 
under paragraph (g) out of concern that they were more prone to 
abuse due to the difficulty of confirming the amount of taxes paid at 
different stages in the production process.70  That difficulty would 
be compounded with rebates of taxes occultes, whereas taxes on 
physically incorporated inputs into products would be relatively 
easier to verify.71  Significantly, however, no comparable language 
in paragraph (g) precluded the border adjustment of taxes on other 
(non-PSCI) forms of indirect taxes on goods or services used in the 
production process that were not physically incorporated into the 
final exported product.  The 1979 Subsidies Code, therefore, 
implicitly acknowledged that non-PSCI indirect taxes on 
unincorporated production inputs could be rebated on exported 
products. 
2.7.  The ASCM  
The differential treatment of BTAs on unincorporated inputs 
depending on the form of the indirect tax became a subject of debate 
during the subsidy negotiations in the Uruguay Round.72  India 
argued that precluding the border adjustment of PSCI taxes on 
unincorporated inputs “places at a disadvantage countries with 
multi-stage cumulative tax systems vis-à-vis those with value-
added tax systems [covered under paragraph (g)] as in the latter, 
there is no impediment to the exporter collecting full credit for all 
 
 70 See HOERNER & MULLER, supra note 56, at 32: 
The purpose of forbidding PSCI taxes is to prevent nations from 
subsidizing their exports through excessive tax rebates or credits.  PSCI 
taxes are believed to be especially prone to this abuse because it is often 
difficult for a company or the government to know precisely how much 
tax was paid over the various stages of production.  This policy explains 
the major exception to the PSCI tax ban [in the 1979 Subsidies Code]: goods 
physically incorporated into the exported good.  These incorporated 
goods are exempted because it is usually possible to determine how much 
of the taxed good is present in the final product. 
 71 Id. 
 72 See Comm. on Trade and Env’t, Negotiating History of Footnote 61 of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/16, ¶ 6 
(Dec. 1, 1995) [https://perma.cc/QFH2-9WH3]. 
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prior stage taxes paid on inputs.”73  Switzerland supported the 
border adjustability of indirect taxes on unincorporated inputs, 
including “charges on services, such as transportation and 
communication, as well as on machinery, and on fungible inputs 
such as fuel and electricity used in the manufacturing process .  . . . “74 
The proposal to permit border adjustment of taxes on 
unincorporated inputs of both cumulative (PSCI) and non-
cumulative taxes was adopted in 1991 and incorporated in the text 
of the ASCM.75  The revision took the form of an amendment to 
paragraph (h) replacing the phrase “goods that are physically 
incorporated . . . in the exported product” as defining the subject of 
charges that could be border adjusted with “inputs that are 
 
 73 Negotiating Grp. on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, Elements of the 
Framework for Negotiations: Submission by India, GATT Doc. 
MTN.GNG/NG10/W/33, ¶ 4 (Nov. 30, 1989) [https://perma.cc/9J45-LW32].  See 
also Negotiating Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Communication 
from India, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/16, at 4 (Feb. 1, 1988), 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=164179&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&Ful
lTextHash=371857150&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSp
anishRecord=True [https://perma.cc/9CTQ-AB9H].  India had raised the issue 
earlier, proposing that 
rebate of prior stage cumulative indirect taxes should not be treated as a 
countervailable subsidy whether or not such taxes have been levied on 
goods and services physically incorporated in the exported product.  
Article VI of GATT states that no product can be subject to countervailing 
duty by reason of the exemption of such product from taxes or duties 
borne by the like products when destined for consumption in the country 
of origin.  This provision clearly suggests that rebate of taxes on auxiliary 
material (e.g., energy, fuel, lubricants, packing, stationary), durable capital 
goods (e.g., machinery buildings, vehicles) and services (e.g. transport, 
advertising) cannot be treated as countervailable subsidies. 
 74 Negotiating Grp. on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Elements of the 
Negotiating Framework Communication from Switzerland, GATT Doc. 
MTN.GNG/NG10/W/26, at 15 (Sept. 13, 1989) (emphasis added), 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=164190&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&Ful
lTextHash=371857150&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSp
anishRecord=True [https://perma.cc/38GL-B8RT]. 
 75 See Comm. on Trade and Env’t supra note 72, ¶ 3–4. The ASCM retained the 
1979 Subsidy Code’s definition of adjustable indirect taxes. Compare Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14, Annex I note 
58, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S4PB-N3CM], with 1979 Subsidies Code, supra note 58, Annex 
note 1 (both defining “indirect taxes” as “sales, excise, turnover, value added, 
franchise, stamp, transfer,  inventory  and  equipment  taxes,  border  taxes  and  all  
taxes  other  than  direct  taxes  and import charges.”). 
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consumed in the production of the exported product.”76  Annex II of 
the ASCM provides “Guidelines on Consumption of Inputs in the 
Production Process.”77  Footnote 61, appended to the Annex, 
clarifies that “[i]nputs consumed in the production process are 
inputs physically incorporated, energy, fuels and oil used in the 
production process and catalysts which are consumed in the course of their 
use to obtain the exported product.”78  The ASCM thus explicitly 
permits the border adjustment on exports of energy and fuels that 
are consumed during the productions process. 
3.  GATT AND WTO JURISPRUDENCE RELEVANT TO BTAS  
The limited GATT and WTO case law addressing BTAs provides 
further support for the adjustability of taxes on unincorporated 
inputs.  In the Superfund dispute,79 Canada and the European 
Economic Community (EEC) challenged a U.S. tax on certain 
imported substances that were manufactured using feedstock 
chemicals that would have been taxed if sold in the United States.80  
The panel accepted the United States’ argument that the import tax 
was a BTA of the domestic tax on feedstock chemicals and therefore 
was permitted under GATT Articles II:2(a) and III:2.81  Some of the 
volatile feedstock chemicals subject to the border tax adjustment 
 
 76 ASCM, supra note 75, Annex II § I ¶ 1.  See also 1979 Subsidies Code, supra 
note 58, Annex ¶ (i) (referring to “inputs that are consumed in the production 
process of the exported product”). 
 77 ASCM, supra note 75, Annex II; see also id. Annex III § I (reflecting the 
revision in Annex II § I by referring to “inputs which are consumed in the 
production process . . . .”). 
 78 ASCM, supra note 75, Annex II note 61 (emphasis added). 
 79 Report of the Panel, United States—Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported 
Substances, WTO Doc. L/6175 – 34S/136 (June 17, 1987) [hereinafter Taxes on 
Petroleum], https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/gatt_e/87superf.pdf [https://perma.cc/24BL-L88S]. 
 80 See id. ¶¶ 1.1, 2.1, 2.3–2.5. 
 81 See id. ¶5.2.8 (concluding that “to the extent that the tax on certain imported 
substances was equivalent to the tax borne by like domestic substances as a result 
of the tax on certain chemicals the tax met the national treatment requirement of 
Article III:2, first sentence.”).  See also Report of the Panel, Japan—Customs Duties, 
Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, L/6216–
34S/83, §5.8 (Nov. 10, 1987), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gatt_e/87beverg.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GS5W-SR29] (noting that the reference to taxes imposed 
“indirectly” under Article III:2 encompasses taxes on “raw materials used in the 
product during the various stages of its production”). 
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were converted to “stable and non-reacting substances”82 during the 
production of the relevant imported products, indicating that there 
is no requirement that inputs that are subject to the border-adjusted 
tax be physically present in the same form in the final product.83 
Significantly, the panel rejected the assertion by the EEC and 
Canada that the BTA on certain feedstock chemicals was 
inconsistent with GATT because “the pollution created in the 
production of the imported substances did not occur in the United 
States.”84  The panel responded that 
the tax adjustment rules of the [GATT] distinguish between 
taxes on products and taxes not directly levied on products 
they do not distinguish between taxes with different policy 
purposes.  Whether a sales tax is levied on a product for 
general revenue purposes or to encourage the rational use of 
environmental resources, is therefore not relevant for the 
determination of the eligibility of a tax for border tax 
adjustment.85 
The Superfund panel also provided guidance on the appropriate 
approach to assessing BTAs on the inputs of imported products.  
The law stipulated that the BTA would be set at the same level that 
would have applied if the taxable inputs had been sold in the United 
States.86  The amount of the tax would be determined based on 
information provided by the importer.87  If the importer failed to 
present sufficient information on the amount of the taxable 
 
 82 See Taxes on Petroleum, supra note 79, ¶ 3.2.11. 
 83 See Hoerner & Muller, supra note 56, at 35 (“[N]othing in the [Superfund] 
Panel’s reasoning depended on the physical incorporation.  Thus, this standard 
should also apply to feedstock chemicals used in manufacture and not physically 
incorporated . . . including taxes on energy or carbon and taxes occultes more 
generally.”).  See also Comm. on Trade and Env’t, Note by the Secretariat: Taxes and 
Charges for Environmental Purposes—Border Tax Adjustment, WTO Doc. 
WT/CTE/W/47, ¶ 70 (May 2, 1997), 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=6608&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullT
extHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecor
d=True [https://perma.cc/9EKV-3ULK] (“[I]t is not clear . . . whether those 
[taxable] substances were still physically present in the final product, or whether 
they had been exhausted in the production process, and the [Superfund] panel 
made no distinction to that effect.”). 
 84 Taxes on Petroleum, supra note 79, ¶ 3.2.7. 
 85 Id. ¶ 5.2.4. 
 86 See id. ¶ 2.5. 
 87 See id. ¶ 2.6. 
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chemicals used in manufacturing the imported substances, a 5% ad 
valorem tax would be imposed, unless the Secretary of Treasury 
issued regulations providing for the tax to be assessed based on the 
amount of the taxable chemical inputs that would be consumed 
using the “predominant method of production.”88 
The panel indicated that the 5% ad valorem approach would 
violate Article III:2 if it exceeded the tax that would be imposed on 
the equivalent amount of the chemical inputs under the internal 
tax.89  However, if the importer failed to provide adequate 
information about the consumption of taxable feedstock chemicals 
in the production process, the assessment of the BTA based on the 
predominant method of production would be consistent with 
Article III:2.90 
Although Superfund indicates that the amount of taxable inputs 
into an imported product may be averaged for purposes of 
calculating BTAs, the Appellate Body’s report in India—Additional 
Duties91 clarifies that the tax rates imposed under internal taxes may 
not be averaged if averaging would result in BTAs in excess of the 
level imposed on like domestic products.  The dispute involved a 
challenge by the United States to two border charges imposed by 
India on alcoholic beverages and certain other products, which the 
United States argued violated India’s tariff comments under Article 
II.92  India characterized the charges as border adjustments of 
various internal taxes imposed on domestic products, including 
excise duties, sales taxes, VATs, and other local taxes.93  The 
Appellate Body held, however, that the averaging of internal taxes 
 
 88 Id. 
 89 See Taxes on Petroleum, supra note 79, ¶ 5.2.9. 
 90 See Taxes on Petroleum, supra note 79, ¶¶ 5.2.9–5.2.10.  This is consistent with 
the position taken by the 1970 Working Party on the use of averages in calculating 
BTAs for composite goods.  See Working Party Report, supra note 27, § 2: 
[C]ountries operating cascade systems usually resorted to calculating 
average rates of rebate for categories of products . . . Other examples 
included composite goods, which, on export, contained ingredients for 
which the Working Party agreed in principle it was administratively 
sensible and sufficiently accurate to rebate by average rates for a given 
class of goods. 
 91 Appellate Body Report, India—Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on 
Imports from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS360/AB/R (Oct. 30, 2008), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/360abr_e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JVN5-B3XV]. 
 92  See id. ¶¶ 1–3. 
 93  See id. ¶ 4. 
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for purposes of assessing BTAs was not consistent with Article 
II:2(a) to the extent that it resulted in BTAs on imported products 
that exceeded the corresponding internal charges on like domestic 
products.94 
4. THE PPM DEBATE 
In contrast to the long history of negotiations addressing border 
tax adjustments and the resulting language in the GATT and the 
ASCM, the PPM debate has emerged largely from GATT and WTO 
jurisprudence.  The debate over PPMs reflects broad concerns about 
the appropriateness of importing nations using border restrictions 
to achieve extraterritorial regulatory objectives, and, 
correspondingly, the sovereign interests of exporting nations in 
controlling regulatory standards within their borders.95  As 
discussed below, although these concerns appear to have arisen 
independent of any particular treaty text, the PPM issue has come to 
be primarily associated with the question of whether products are 
“like” for purposes of Article III:4 of GATT96 and whether PPM-
based border measures are consistent with the chapeau 
(introductory paragraph) of Article XX.97 
 
 94 See id. ¶¶ 208–221. 
 95 See Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction—An 
Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism” in Trade Policy, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L.  249, 
274–76 (2000) (discussing objections to PPM-based measures as inappropriate 
attempts to exert extraterritorial influence over the regulatory policies of other 
countries). 
 96 See Joel P. Trachtman, WTO Trade and Environment Jurisprudence: Avoiding 
Environmental Catastrophe, 58 HARV. INT’L L. J. 273, 281 (2017): 
The legal issue relating to PPMs is whether GATT/WTO law authorizes 
WTO members to maintain regulatory distinctions based on PPMs of 
imported products. In particular, the debate has focused on whether 
products that comply with specified PPM criteria and those that do not are 
“like” for the purpose of the national treatment obligations of Article III. 
See also AMBER ROSE MAGGIO, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, NON-PRODUCT RELATED 
PROCESS AND PRODUCTION METHODS AND THE LAW OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 85–86 (2017) (discussing relevance of NPR PPMs to “like product” 
analysis). 
 97 See Charnovitz supra note 8, at 92–102 (discussing status of PPM-based 
measures under Article XX of GATT). 
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4.1. Tuna-Dolphin I & II 
The focus on the NPR-PPM issue as an obstacle to environmental 
trade measures can be largely traced to the unadopted reports of the 
GATT panels in the first round of the Tuna-Dolphin disputes in the 
early 1990s.  In Tuna-Dolphin I, Mexico challenged U.S. prohibitions 
on the import of tuna from countries that did not adopt a regulatory 
system that was comparable to the United States program for 
preventing incidental harm to dolphins and other marine mammals 
from fishing, or from intermediary countries that imported tuna 
from countries subject to the primary ban.98  Mexico argued that the 
import bans constituted quantitative restrictions in violation of 
Article XI of GATT.99  Moreover, domestic and imported tuna were 
“like products” and it was not permissible under Article III of GATT 
to distinguish between them based on their production processes.100  
The United States countered that the ban on imported products was 
simply an enforcement of the domestic restrictions on harvesting 
tuna, as permitted under Article III:4 and the Note Ad Article III, 
and therefore not covered under Article XI.101 
The panel sided with Mexico, although it did not explicitly frame 
its analysis in terms of the “like product” issue.102  The panel instead 
indicated that regulations addressing the process for harvesting 
tuna “could not be regarded as being applied to tuna products as 
such because they would not directly regulate the sale of tuna and 
could not possibly affect tuna as a product.”103  Accordingly, the panel 
concluded, the import prohibitions did not qualify as “internal 
 
 98 See Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, WTO 
Doc. DS21/R - 39S/155,  ¶¶ 2.1–2.9, 5.1–5.5 (Sept. 3, 1991) [Hereinafter Report on 
Tuna-Dolphin I], 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gatt_e/91tuna.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8U6V-P5RE]. 
 99 Id.  ¶¶ 3.1–3.2, 3.10. 
 100 Id.  ¶ 3.16. 
 101 Id.  ¶¶ 3.6–3.7, 5.8.  The Note Ad Article III states that any internal tax or 
regulation that applies to both domestic and imported “like” products and is 
enforced with regard to the imported product at the time of importation shall be 
treated as an internal tax or regulation subject to Article III.  See GATT, supra note 
25, Annex I, Ad Article III. 
 102 See Howse &  Regan, supra note 95, at 254 (“The Tuna/Dolphin I panel’s 
argument is by no means clear, since the panel introduces without definition the 
notion of measures ‘affecting products as such’ and the notion of how a measure 
affects a product ‘as a product’ . . . [t]he panel does not focus on the issue of ‘like’ 
products . . . .”). 
 103 See Report on Tuna-Dolphin I supra note 98, ¶ 5.14 (emphasis added). 
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regulations” covered under Article III:4 and the Note ad Article III, 
and instead were prohibited quantitative restrictions under Article 
XI. 104 
The panel similarly stressed that the embargoes were based on 
the production process rather than the product itself in rejecting the 
United States’ assertion that the measures were permissible under 
the environmental exceptions in Article XX of GATT.105  Article 
XX(b) applies to measures “necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health” and Article XX(g) covers measures “relating to 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures 
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption . . . .” The panel cautioned that if the 
exceptions could be applied to measures based on production 
processes outside the jurisdiction of the country, “each contracting 
party could unilaterally determine the conservation policies from 
which other contracting parties could not deviate without 
jeopardizing their rights under the [GATT].”106 
Three years later another GATT panel reached similar 
conclusions regarding the tuna embargoes in a dispute brought by 
intermediary countries (the Netherlands and the European 
Economic Community). 107  In Tuna-Dolphin II, the panel found that 
Article III and the Note ad Article III did not cover the embargoes 
on tuna because they were based on the harvesting methods for the 
tuna and “none of these practices, policies and methods could have 
any impact on the inherent character of tuna as a product.”108  
Accordingly, the panel concluded—like the panel in Tuna-Dolphin 
I—that the embargoes were quantitative restrictions covered by and 
inconsistent with Article XI:1.109 
The panel, however, took a different approach in rejecting the 
application of the Article XX exceptions, stressing the coercive 
nature of the embargoes rather than their extraterritorial reach.  On 
the latter issue, the panel indicated that there was “no valid reason 
supporting the conclusion that the provisions of Article XX(g) apply 
 
 104 Id., ¶¶ 5.14, 5.17–18, and 5.35 – 36. 
 105 Id., ¶¶ 5.23–34. 
 106 Id., ¶¶ 3.40, 5.23, 5.32. 
 107 Report of the Panel, United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, WTO Doc. 
DS29/R (June 16, 1994), [Hereinafter Report on Tuna-Dolphin II] 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gatt_e/92tuna.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5QQQ-MCAL]. 
 108 Id. ¶ 5.9. 
 109 Id. ¶ 5.10. 
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only to policies related to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources located within the territory of the contracting party 
invoking the provision.”110  The panel reached a similar conclusion 
with regard to Article XX(b).111  The panel found, however, that the 
tuna embargoes were outside the scope of both Article XX(b) and 
XX(g) because they were intended to coerce other countries to 
change their conservation policies, which the panel viewed as 
fundamentally inconsistent with the GATT’s role as a multilateral 
framework for guaranteeing market access to the contracting 
parties.112 
The focus of the panels in Tuna Dolphin I and Tuna Dolphin II on 
the lack of effect of the production process on the tuna “as a 
product” has been widely interpreted as indicating that different 
NPR-PPMs do not make products “unlike” for purposes of Article 
III of the GATT.  The approach currently taken by the Appellate 
Body in assessing likeness, however, is arguably at least somewhat 
more accommodating of PPM-based regulatory distinctions.  
Although the Appellate Body has noted that the assessment of 
likeness under Article III is ultimately “a determination about the 
nature and extent of a competitive relationship between and among 
the products,”113 it may consider a number of factors—including 
consumer preferences—in making that assessment.114 
 
 110 Id. ¶ 5.20. 
 111 Id. ¶¶ 5.30–33. 
 112 Id. ¶¶ 5.23–27, 5.36–39. 
 113 Appellate Body Report, Philippines—Taxes on Distilled Spirits, ¶ 119, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS396/AB/R, WT/DS403/AB/R (adopted Dec. 21, 2011) [hereinafter 
Philippines—Distilled Spirits], 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(@Symb
ol=%20wt/ds403/ab/r*%20not%20rw*)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerS
criptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true# [https://perma.cc/93Q2-E6HS].  In 
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Mar. 12, 2001) 
[hereinafter EC-Asbestos], 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(@Symb
ol=%20wt/ds135/ab/r*%20not%20rw*)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerS
criptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true# [https://perma.cc/LCB4-KGZM], the 
Appellate Body suggested that the standard for likeness was narrower under 
Article III:2 than Article III:4 (¶¶ 93–6), and that the likeness inquiry under the latter 
provision should focus on the existence of a competitive relationship between the 
products (¶ 99).  In Philippines—Distilled Spirits, however, the Appellate Body 
indicated that the likeness analysis under Article III:2 should similarly focus on the 
products’ competitive relationship. 
 114 The relevant factors include “the product’s end-uses in a given market; 
consumers’ tastes and habits, which change from country to country; the product’s 
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Under this approach, the NPR-PPM of an imported product is 
generally an insufficient basis to deem it to be non-like a competitive 
domestic product and therefore subject to less favorable regulatory 
treatment.  At least in theory, however, NPR-PPMs could support a 
finding of non-likeness if they had a sufficient impact on consumer 
preferences with regard to otherwise competitive imported and 
domestic products.115 
4.2.  Shrimp-Turtle I & II 
The Appellate Body has been even more accommodating of 
NPR-PPMs under Article XX, rejecting the Tuna-Dolphin II panel’s 
suggestion that any border measures contingent on the production 
processes of an exporting country are fundamentally incompatible 
with Article XX.  In its reports in the Shrimp-Turtle dispute, the 
Appellate Body established a more nuanced approach that focuses 
on two factors in assessing the consistency of PPM-based border 
measures with Article XX: (1) whether they are contingent on the 
actions of governments or private market actors, and (2) whether 
they require adoption of particular production processes or merely 
achievement of certain standards of protection.116 
The Shrimp-Turtle dispute involved a challenge by India, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand to a U.S. ban on the importation of 
shrimp from countries that did not require the use of “turtle 
excluder devices” (“TEDs”) to prevent sea turtles from being killed 
 
properties, nature[,] and quality . . . [and the product’s] tariff classification . . . .”  
Philippines—Distilled Spirits, supra note 113, ¶ 118 n.210. 
 115 See Trachtman, supra note 96, at 281: 
The implication of the competition-based approach to “likeness” is that, 
unless consumers distinguish between products on the basis of the PPM, 
differences in PPMs are unlikely to render products “un-like.”  For 
example, in the case of carbon regulation, unless consumers distinguish 
between products on the basis of the amount of carbon used in their 
manufacture, high carbon-intensity and low carbon-intensity products 
would be treated as like products. 
See also Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New 
Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 489, 513 
(2002) (“For Article III:4 purposes, no particular physical characteristic is 
dispositive, in the abstract, of whether a product is ‘like’ or unlike.  Other factors, 
such as consumer preferences, must be considered in forming a judgment based on 
the criteria that the Appellate Body approved . . . .”). 
 116 See infra notes 122–143 and accompanying text. 
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in the nets of shrimp boats.117  The panel found that the import ban 
constituted an impermissible quantitative restriction under Article 
XI of the GATT that was not justified under Article XX(b) or (g), 
citing Tuna-Dolphin II in support of its conclusion that permitting 
one country to restrict market access in order to coerce another 
country to adopt certain policies would threaten the multilateral 
trading system.118  
On appeal, the Appellate Body noted that assessment of a 
measure under Article XX requires a “two-tiered” analysis.119  First, 
the measure must be “provisionally justified” in that it is within one 
of the specific exceptions provided for in paragraphs (a) through (j) 
of Article XX.120  Second, the measure must comply with the chapeau 
of Article XX, which states that measures must not be “applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade . . . .”121 
The Appellate Body found that the import ban was provisionally 
justified under Article XX(g) and reversed the panel’s finding that 
the measure was a priori excluded from Article XX because it made 
access to the U.S. shrimp market contingent on the adoption of 
certain policies designed to protect sea turtles.122  The Appellate 
Body observed in paragraph 121 of its report that the test applied by 
the panel had no basis in the text of Article XX, and noted further 
that 
conditioning access to a Member’s domestic market on 
whether exporting Members comply with, or adopt, a policy 
 
 117 See Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 1–5, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 
1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle I AB Report], 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(@Symb
ol=%20wt/ds58/ab/r*%20not%20rw*)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerSc
riptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true# [https://perma.cc/6VKB-VQHR]. 
 118 See Report of the Panel, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 7.43–46, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/R (adopted May 15, 1998), 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(@Symb
ol=%20wt/ds58/r*%20not%20rw*)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScript
edSearch&languageUIChanged=true# [https://perma.cc/RPF7-FC99]. 
 119 See Shrimp-Turtle I AB Report, supra note 117, ¶ 118 (quoting Appellate Body 
Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted Apr. 29, 1996), at 22). 
 120 See Shrimp-Turtle I AB Report, supra note 117, ¶ 125. 
 121 See GATT, supra note 25, art. XX. 
 122 See Shrimp-Turtle I AB Report, supra note 117, ¶¶ 112–22. 
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or policies unilaterally prescribed by the importing Member 
may, to some degree, be a common aspect of measures 
falling with the scope . . . of Article XX. . . .  It is not necessary 
to assume that requiring from exporting countries 
compliance with, or adoption of, certain policies . . . 
prescribed by the importing country, renders a measure a 
priori incapable of justification under Article XX.  Such an 
interpretation renders most, if not all, of the specific 
exceptions of Article XX inutile, a result abhorrent to the 
principles of interpretation we are bound to apply.123 
Yet despite rejecting the panel’s suggestion that a WTO Member 
may not condition market access on another Member’s adoption of 
certain policies, the Appellate Body concluded that the turtle 
protection measure had been implemented in a manner that 
constituted “unjustifiable discrimination” under the chapeau of 
Article XX.124 
“Perhaps the most conspicuous flaw in this measure’s 
application,” the Appellate Body stated, was “its intended and 
actual coercive effect on the specific policy decisions made by 
foreign governments,” which effectively required all other WTO 
Members attempting to export shrimp to the United States “to adopt 
essentially the same policy . . . as that applied to, and enforced on, 
United States domestic shrimp trawlers.”125  This coercive approach 
precluded even imports of shrimp harvested using TEDs if those 
shrimp were harvested in the waters of countries that had not been 
certified as requiring the use of TEDs.126  The Appellate Body 
indicated that the focus on the adoption of the particular regulatory 
approach rather than allowing for “flexibility” in achieving the 
policy goal of protecting sea turtles resulted in unjustified 
discrimination because it did not “allow for any inquiry into the 
appropriateness of the regulatory program for the conditions 
prevailing in  . . .  exporting countries.”127 
 
 123 Id. ¶ 121. 
 124 Id. ¶¶ 161-176. 
 125 Id. ¶ 161. 
 126 Id. ¶ 165. 
 127 Id.  The Appellate Body also found the application of the import ban to 
constitute unjustifiable discrimination under the chapeau because the United States 
had failed to attempt to negotiate an approach to the conservation of sea turtles 
with all affected countries (¶¶ 166–72) and had provided some countries with 
longer periods for implementing the required use of TEDs (¶¶ 173–4) and greater 
access to relevant technology (¶ 175).  The Appellate Body further concluded that 
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The apparent tension between the Appellate Body’s statements 
on PPM-based measures in Shrimp-Turtle I was clarified in the 
subsequent compliance proceeding.  The United States issued 
revised guidelines implementing the import ban, which permitted 
shrimp to be imported not only from countries that required the use 
of TEDs on shrimp trawlers, but also from countries with policies 
for protecting sea turtles that were “comparably effective” to the use 
of TEDs.128 
Before the panel in the compliance proceeding, Malaysia argued 
that the revised guidelines continued to violate Article XI and were 
not justified under Article XX(g).129  The panel agreed that the 
revised guidelines violated Article XI but found that they were 
sufficiently flexible and non-coercive to be justified under Article 
XX(g).130  The panel noted that the revised guidelines permitted not 
only the importation of shrimp from countries certified as having 
implemented a program for protecting sea turtles that achieved a 
comparable level of protection to the mandatory use of TEDs,131 but 
also shrimp caught with TEDs from countries that were not 
certified.132 
The Appellate Body upheld the panel’s finding that the revised 
guidelines, by permitting certification of countries with sea turtle 
protection programs that were “comparable in effectiveness” to the 
U.S. policies, were sufficiently flexible to avoid constituting 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination under the chapeau of 
 
the ban had been applied in a manner that constituted impermissible “arbitrary 
discrimination” under the chapeau, due to its inflexible implementation (¶ 177) and 
the lack of “basic fairness and due process” in the process for certifying countries 
as complying with the turtle protection standards (¶ 181). 
 128 See Report of Panel, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, ¶ 2.28, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS58/RW (June 15, 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle II Panel Report], 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query= 
(@Symbol=%20wt/ds58/rw*%20not%20rw2*)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=F
omerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true# [https://perma.cc/UBR3-SQJS]. 
 129 Id. ¶ 5.2. 
 130 Id. ¶¶ 5.89–5.107. 
 131 Id. ¶¶ 5.90–5.104. 
 132 Id. ¶¶ 5.105–5.111.  The panel also concluded that the revised regulation 
addressed the Appellate Body’s concerns noted supra in note 127 regarding the 
United States’ failure to attempt to negotiate a multilateral approach to protecting 
sea turtles with all affected countries (¶¶ 5.30–5.88), the discriminatory phase-in 
periods (paras. 5.112–5.116) and approach to technology transfers (¶¶ 5.117-5.120), 
and the lack of due process in determining compliance with the guidelines (¶¶ 
5.126–5.136). 
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Article XX.133  Significantly, in reaching this conclusion, the 
Appellate Body quoted its language in paragraph 121 of the original 
proceeding,134 noting that measures protected under Article XX 
would frequently involve conditioning market access on policies 
prescribed by the importing country.135  This statement, the 
Appellate Body indicated, “expresses a principle that was central to 
our ruling in United States—Shrimp.”136 
Taken together, the Appellate Body’s reports in the Shrimp—
Turtle dispute can be read to suggest that PPM-based measures can 
be divided into four tiers of increasing flexibility for the purposes of 
assessing their compliance with the chapeau of Article XX: 
(1) measures that require exporting countries to adopt policies 
mandating the use of certain PPMs; 
(2) measures that require exporting countries to adopt policies 
that are comparably effective in achieving the level of 
protection of the importing country’s domestic program, 
without mandating the use of particular PPMs; 
(3) measures that require producers in the exporting country to 
use certain PPMs, regardless of whether they are mandated 
by the government of the exporting country, and 
(4) measures that require producers in the exporting country to 
achieve a certain standard of protection comparable to the 
standard achieved by importing country’s domestic 
program, without requiring either that the exporting 
government mandate or that the producer use particular 
PPMs. 
Tier 1 measures, such as the original guidelines rejected by the 
Appellate Body in Shrimp Turtle I, are generally incompatible with 
the chapeau of Article XX.137  The status of Tier 2 measures that 
require only that the government of the exporting country achieve a 
 
 133 See Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia ¶¶ 135–
150, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp-
Turtle II AB Report].  The Appellate Body indicated that the compliance of the 
revised guidelines with the chapeau was contingent on the United States’ “ongoing 
serious good faith efforts to reach a multilateral agreement.”  Id. ¶ 151. 
 134 See Shrimp-Turtle I AB Report, supra note 117, ¶ 121. 
 135 See Shrimp-Turtle II Panel Report, supra note 128. 
 136 Shrimp-Turtle II AB Report, supra note 133, ¶ 138. 
 137 Conceivably a Tier 1 measure could be justified under the chapeau if it was 
based on an adequate assessment of the appropriateness of a particular regulatory 
approach for the exporting country.  See supra notes 125–127 and accompanying 
text. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss1/2
2019] Carbon Border Adjustments 35 
comparable level of protection, such as the revised guidelines 
approved by the Appellate Body in Shrimp—Turtle II, is less clear.  
The panel in Shrimp—Turtle II indicated that the revised guidelines 
were only compliant with the chapeau because they also included a 
Tier 3 provision—i.e. they permitted the importation of TED-caught 
shrimp from countries that had not been certified as having a sea 
turtle protection program comparably effective to that of the United 
States.138 
Yet, as Robert Howse has noted, the Appellate Body in Shrimp—
Turtle II did not indicate that permitting shipment-by-shipment 
certification of turtle-safe shrimp was required for the revised 
guidelines to comply with the chapeau.139  The United States had not 
appealed the panel’s finding on the need to permit the importation 
of TED-caught shrimp from non-certified countries, and the 
Appellate Body did not rely on this aspect of the revised guidelines 
in determining that they were adequately flexible to satisfy the 
chapeau.140  Howse argues that requiring shipment-by-shipment 
certification of compliance with a NPR PPM-based standard would 
be incompatible with the Appellate Body’s assertion in paragraph 
121 of Shrimp—Turtle I, reiterated in Shrimp—Turtle II, that measures 
that are justified under Article XX frequently “condition[] access to 
a Member’s domestic market on whether exporting Members 
comply with, or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed by 
the importing Member . . . .”141 
If paragraph 121 is read to refer to Tier 1 measures, it is difficult 
to reconcile with the Appellate Body’s finding in Shrimp—Turtle I 
that the original guidelines were impermissibly inflexible and 
coercive precisely because they conditioned market access on the 
adoption by exporting countries of specific policies regarding the 
protection of sea turtles.142  A possible alternative interpretation is 
that the reference in paragraph 121 to “policy or policies unilaterally 
prescribed by the importing Member” encompasses Tier 2 
measures, i.e. policies framed in terms of achieving a particular 
 
 138 See Shrimp-Turtle II Panel Report, supra note 128, ¶ 5.111 (“[W]e consider that 
the United States, by modifying its guidelines and adjusting its practice so as to 
permit import of TED-caught shrimp from non-certified countries complies, as long 
as that situation remains, with the DSB recommendations and rulings in this 
respect.”). 
 139 See Howse, supra note 115, at 511–512. 
 140 Id. at 512. 
 141 See Shrimp-Turtle I AB Report, supra note 117, ¶ 121. 
 142 See Shrimp-Turtle II AB Report, supra note 133, ¶ 137. 
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standard of protection.  Conditioning market access on the adoption 
of regulatory mandates by the exporting company may in theory be 
compatible with the chapeau of Article XX, but it may also be 
deemed impermissibly inflexible and coercive if the same standard 
of protection could be achieved under an alternative regulatory 
program.  Under this approach, a Tier 2 measure could be 
considered consistent with the chapeau given that it would 
represent a less coercive alternative to requiring the exporting 
country to adopt a specific regulatory approach. 
Regardless of how paragraph 121 is interpreted with regard to 
Tier 2 measures, both the panel and Appellate Body reports in the 
Shrimp—Turtle dispute indicate that Tier 3 measures, requiring 
producers in the exporting country to use certain PPMs without 
requiring the government of the exporting country to adopt any 
regulatory program, are generally permissible under the chapeau.143  
And Tier 4 measures, which simply require that exporters meet 
certain non-product related performance standards comparable to 
those of the importing country, provide for maximum flexibility and 
the lowest level of intrusion on exporting Members’ sovereignty and 
accordingly are compatible with the chapeau. 
5. CARBON BTAS AND THE PPM ISSUE 
Despite the prominent role the PPM issue has played in the 
Appellate Body’s jurisprudence addressing environmental 
measures, it should not constitute a significant obstacle to the 
development and implementation of WTO-consistent carbon taxes.  
As discussed below, GATT Articles II:2(a) and III:2 and the ASCM 
explicitly permit the border adjustment of taxes on inputs used in 
the production process of “like” products. Similarly, Article XX’s 
exceptions apply to measures—like properly designed carbon 
BTAs—that are based on the production processes of imported 
products, so long as the measures are sufficiently flexible and do not 
coerce the exporting countries to adopt policies mandating the use 
of specific PPMs. 
 
 143 See supra notes 130–132 and accompanying text. 
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5.1.  Carbon BTAs and “Like Product” Doctrine 
The PPM doctrine that has emerged from the WTO’s GATT 
jurisprudence should have limited implications for BTAs on carbon 
taxes.  As discussed in Section 2, the text of GATT Article II:2(a) 
permits the adjustment of indirect taxes not only on “like” imported 
products, but also on “articles from which” the like imported 
products have been produced.  Article III:2 similarly permits the 
adjustment of indirect taxes imposed not only directly on like 
products, but also imposed “indirectly,” reflecting the intent of the 
drafters to protect the longstanding practice of border-adjusting 
consumption taxes, including taxes on different stages of the 
production process.144 
Accordingly, a country imposing a carbon BTA on an imported 
product would not need to demonstrate that the production 
processes for the imported and domestic products subject to the tax 
rendered them “unlike” and therefore subject to different treatment.  
Instead, it would simply assert its right to border adjust on imports 
the taxes imposed “indirectly” (i.e. through taxes on a production 
input) on like domestic products.  As reflected in the Superfund panel 
report, the focus of the inquiry under GATT Articles II:2(a) and III:2 
with regard to a carbon BTA would not be on the likeness of the 
manufactured products, but rather whether the BTA on the 
imported product is assessed at a level that exceeds the tax on the 
domestic product.145  The ASCM is even more explicit with regard 
to export BTAs, permitting the border adjustment of taxes on both 
incorporated and unincorporated inputs used to produce like 
 
 144 See supra Section 2.2. 
 145 See Joost Pauwelyn, Carbon Leakage Measures and Border Tax Adjustments 
under WTO Law, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH & THE WTO 448, 
489 (Geert Van Calster & Denise Prévost eds., 2013) (“[I]t would be rather odd for 
the WTO to intervene in this question of differentiating between types of steel 
depending on their carbon footprint, once the WTO has earlier accepted that carbon 
taxes or regulations can be adjusted at the border.  In the US—Superfund case . . . 
the panel never questioned whether (taxed) imports produced with the chemicals 
were ‘like’ US products not produced with the chemicals.”).  See also Ross Astoria, 
Design of an International Trade Law Compliant Carbon Border Tax Adjustment, 6 ARIZ. 
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 491, 506 (2015) (“It seems likely that the panel in [U.S.]—
Superfund implicitly assumed that the domestic and imported chemical products 
were like (because of their identical chemical composition), observed that the tax 
rate on the precursor chemicals was equivalent, and therefore felt no need to inquire 
further.”). 
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products, including “energy, fuels[,] and oil used in the production 
process . . . .”146 
Thus, the NPR-PPM issue plays out very differently with regard 
to regulatory and tax issues.  Border adjustment of NPR-PPM 
regulatory standards is generally prohibited under the like product 
jurisprudence (although potentially permissible under GATT 
Article XX).  In contrast, border adjustment of NPR-PPM based taxes, 
i.e. taxes on prior stages in the production process, is expressly 
permitted under the language of the ASCM and Articles II:2(a) and 
III:2 of the GATT, so long as those taxes are not assessed at a higher 
level than the taxes borne by like domestic products.147 
Conceivably, even a BTA that did not impose a rate that was in 
excess of the rate borne by the like domestic product could be subject 
to challenge on the grounds that, due to the higher CO2e emissions 
associated with the production of an imported product, it was 
subject to a higher effective tax burden than the domestic like 
product.148  It is unclear, however, whether a higher tax burden on 
an imported product that results from the consumption of a higher 
amount of taxable inputs in the production process would be found 
to violate Article III:2.  Such a finding would significantly impair the 
right of WTO Members under Articles II:2(a) and III:2 to border 
adjust indirect taxes on inputs in the production process.149  It would 
also disrupt the parallel treatment of import and export BTAs.150 
Although export BTAs are now covered under the ASCM in 
addition to GATT, both GATT and the ASCM are “integral parts” of 
the WTO Agreement, and their provisions concerning border 
adjustment of taxes should presumably be interpreted in a 
 
 146 See ASCM, supra note 75, at n.61. 
 147 See supra Sections 2.2 and 2.6-2.7. 
 148 See Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Certain Measures Concerning Taxation 
and Charges, ¶ 5.35., WTO Doc. WT/DS472/AB/R, WT/DS497/AB/R  (adopted 
Dec. 13, 2018), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/472_497abr_e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E56D-PHY] (“A determination of whether an infringement of 
Article III:2, first sentence, exists must be made on the basis of an overall assessment 
of the actual tax burdens imposed on imported products, on the one hand, and like 
domestic products, on the other hand.”). 
 149 See Working Party Report, supra note 27. 
 150 See Working Party Report, supra note 27 and accompanying text 
(discussing the consensus of the 1970 Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments 
that the same principles applied to import and export BTAs despite their coverage 
under different provisions of GATT). 
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consistent manner.151  And even if an import BTA of a carbon tax 
were found to violate GATT due to a higher effective tax burden 
based on greater CO2e emissions resulting from its production 
process, it could still be justified under the environmental 
exceptions provisions of Article XX of GATT. 
5.2.  Carbon BTAs and the Chapeau of Article XX 
As discussed supra in Section 4, the PPM issue has been 
implicated under the chapeau of Article XX primarily in the context 
of the Appellate Body jurisprudence indicating that border 
measures must be flexible and not coerce exporting countries into 
adopting specific PPM-based regulatory programs.  A carbon tax 
BTA would be consistent with this principle because it would not be 
a Tier 1 measure that required exporting countries to adopt 
particular PPM-based regulations.  Rather, it would be a least-
coercive Tier 4 approach,152 simply assessing the BTA on imported 
products from EITE sectors  based on the amount of CO2e associated 
with the products’ production, regardless of what specific PPMs the 
manufacturer used to achieve that level of emissions (e.g., energy 
efficiency, different mixtures of energy sources, etc.)153 
5.3.  Calculating the BTAs 
In calculating the BTAs for a carbon tax, the rate applied must 
not exceed the rate applied domestically.154  Some latitude is 
permissible, however, in determining the relevant amount of CO2e 
associated with a product subject to the BTA.155 
The approach that presents the lowest risk of trade conflict 
would be to use reliable data provided by exporters and importers 
regarding the CO2e emissions associated with the production of the 
 
 151 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, art. II:2 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement] (the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements included in Annexes 1–3 of the Marrakesh 
Agreement, including the GATT and the ASCM, “are integral parts of this 
Agreement . . . .”) 
 152 See supra Section 4.2. 
 153 Id. 
 154 See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
 155 See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text. 
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relevant product.156  Where such data is unavailable, the 
government assessing the BTA may determine the relevant amount 
of CO2e subject to the price/ton CO2e by reference to the average 
emissions associated with the “predominant method of production” 
for the product.157 
Some proposals have called for simply assessing BTAs at the 
same amount on imported products as the average amount imposed 
on like domestic products.158  This approach, however, would likely 
violate GATT Article III:2 (and therefore not be protected under 
II:2(a)) if the imported products were in fact manufactured with 
lower associated CO2e emissions, given that it would result in an 
impermissibly higher rate/ton CO2e.159  An import BTA regime 
relying on domestic average emissions for a product, accordingly, 
would need to permit importers to petition for a lower BTA based 
on lower CO2e emissions. 
Export BTAs for products from EITE sectors could be based on 
national averages for the relevant products.  To the extent that a 
manufacturer could demonstrate that it used a more energy-
intensive process than the average and that its products therefore 
bore a higher effective carbon tax burden, it would in theory be 
permissible to assess an export BTA at a level higher than the 
average so long as it did not exceed the actual carbon taxes borne by 
the product.160  This would, however, be inconsistent with the policy 
objectives of the carbon tax in that it could incentivize higher CO2e 
production processes for exported products. 
Conversely, use of national averages could over-compensate 
exporters of products produced with lower than average CO2e 
 
 156 See supra notes 87–89 accompanying text. 
 157 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.  See also Working Party Report, 
supra note 27, ¶ 16 (explaining that average amounts of inputs may be used to 
calculate BTAs for composite goods); Pauwelyn, supra note 145, at 488–91 (noting 
that in the absence of specific information from manufacturers, import BTAs may 
be assessed based on the predominant method of production). 
 158 See, e.g., H.R. 6463, 115th Cong. (2018), 
https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr6463/BILLS-115hr6463ih.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VU4F-MWR4], at 28 (amending the Internal Revenue Code to 
add the following as Section 9912(2): “The term ‘border tax adjustment’ means the 
levying of a tax on imported covered goods equivalent to the amount of tax paid 
pursuant to part 1 of this subtitle in the manufacture of comparable domestic 
manufactured goods . . .”). 
 159 See Astoria, supra note 145, at 514–15 (assessing carbon BTAs based on tax 
borne by like domestic products would violate GATT Article III:2 if it resulted in a 
higher rate of taxation). 
 160 See supra notes 58–78 and accompanying text. 
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emissions and therefore potentially constitute impermissible export 
subsidies under the ASCM.  Such over-compensation, however, 
would, in the aggregate, be offset by the under-compensation for 
exports of higher-CO2e products.  Moreover, as a policy matter, it 
would presumably encourage lower-CO2e production processes. 
6.  CONCLUSION 
The PPM issue has dominated discussions of the relationship 
between trade rules and environmental measures since the first 
Tuna-Dolphin panel report was issued in 1991.  The WTO rules 
addressing the border adjustment of indirect taxes, however, have a 
different and much older provenance.  Governments have border 
adjusted consumption taxes for more than two centuries.  Articles 
II:2(a) and III:2 of GATT 1947 were drafted to accommodate this 
practice with regard not only to taxes on finished products but also 
taxes on inputs used in the production process.  The lingering debate 
over the border adjustment of taxes occultes on energy and other 
inputs that are consumed in the production process was resolved in 
the 1995 ASCM.  Accordingly, properly designed border 
adjustments for carbon taxes are a WTO-consistent policy tool that 
can be used as part of the broader efforts to address the defining 
environmental challenge of our time. 
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